Wednesday, October 30, 2019

Nigeria’s energy infrastructure is not keeping pace with needs


By Eromo Egbejule


A swathe of projects required to meet Nigeria's energy export and consumption goals are falling behind schedule.

For decades, Nigeria overwhelmingly relies on crude oil for the majority of its forex earnings. But the energy sector – like other sectors – has fallen behind in infrastructure investment.
As just one example, all four of its four refineries were set up in the 1960s and 1970s and operate at levels below their refining capacities.

Currently, Nigeria’s daily crude production is around 2 million barrels.
As oil revenues continue to fall and the country’s efforts to diversify its economy continue at snail speed, stakeholders in the sector are hoping for a pick up in the pace of delivery.
Here are some of the key projects, and their progress:
Red light: Halted pipelines, halted policy

Elements of important legislation to help unlock investment, such as the Petroleum Industry Bill have been passed by parliament…. but not agreed to by President Buhari.

Now, the ambition is to pass the bill before the end of 2020, says Senate President Ahmad Lawan.
Progress has also stagnated on a number of pipelines being built across the country, due to financing issues.

“Building pipelines are expensive”, Ademola Henry, team leader at the Facility for Oil Sector Transformation (FOSTER) told BusinessDay. ” When there is no money it’s impossible to mobilise contractors.”

A 614km gas pipeline is being built from Ajaokuta in Kogi state through Kaduna to Kano and could possibly stretch to Algeria. The first phase was due to be completed in 2020 but presidential spokesman Bashir Ahmad tweeted from Saudi Arabia to say the government was seeking investment for it.

Another gas pipeline in the works is the $700m Oben-Obiafu-Obrikom (OB3) line which when completed will boost Nigeria’s gas capacity by 2 billion standard cubic feet of gas per day (2bscf/d). Two years after the initial completion schedule of July 2017, it remains under construction by the NNPC.

Turning amber: Refinery moves

Africa’s richest man Aliko Dangote is erecting the world’s largest single-train refining facility with a capacity of just 650,000 barrels per day just outside Lagos.
The Dangote refinery was scheduled to be completed in 2020.
Analysts warn that it could take up to two more years to finish.

A host of modular refineries – at least eight – are also due to come on stream at various times in 2020, as Nigeria inches towards minimal increases in its petroleum production.

Green-lit: Liquid Natural Gas progress

The new NLNG train terminal is finally moving.
Last month, the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas, the best-performing subsidiary of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) finally issued a letter of intent for the engineering, procurement and construction of the new train for the gas plant.

The final investment decision is expected any moment. A major breakthrough for Nigeria’s extractive industry, the seventh train will add 8,000 mt/year to the Bonny gas facility.

Why this is important: A string of incomplete projects could pose serious challenges for the extractive industry and Nigeria’s forex earnings come 2020 => as well as undermine the administration’s drive to finance broader infrastructure goals in rail and road building.

One interesting policy initiative: pushing for cheaper production costs – and less padding – in oil production.
Nigeria’s cost of oil production per barrel is $30, compared to $10 in Kuwait.



Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Senegal’s president uses political tools to mask authoritarian tactics


By Maurice Soudieck Dione

Senegal’s president Macky Sall /EPA-EFE

Earlier this year Senegal’s president, Macky Sall, embarked on his second term as president pledging “constructive” dialogue with the opposition.

This followed tense elections in which Sall was accused of preventing some of his main rivals from running.

In principle, political dialogue is essential. But in Senegal it’s often used as a way to manipulate public opinion and provide breathing space for a government under fire for its authoritarian tactics.
Throughout Sall’s tenure it has given cover to multiple encroachments on Senegalese democracy. This includes tampering with the rules of the electoral system, empty promises of dialogue and violations of the rights and freedoms of the opposition and government opponents.

These tactics threaten national cohesion, progress and stability in the country.

Broken promises

On taking office in 2012, President Sall cast aside a charter of structural reforms for national governance, the National Conferences Charter, that he himself had signed.
He also backtracked on his oft-repeated commitment to reduce his term in office from seven to five years.

Then, despite opposition and in a very short timeframe, in March 2016 he organised a constitutional referendum..


But the proposed changes – which would have led to the balance of power being distributed more evenly, thus streamlining the country’s extremely top-heavy political system – failed to generate a strong consensus. In the end, no serious reforms were ever implemented that would temper the president’s political, legal and institutional supremacy over executive and judicial power.

Opposition persecution

As a way to demonstrate his commitment to inclusive government, Sall then launched a national dialogue on May 28 – the day after the referendum. This brought together representatives of the political class, civil society, the private sector, trade unions and religious and traditional leaders. Some members of the opposition took part in good faith.

The talks led to the quick release, through presidential pardon, of Karim Wade, the son and former minister of ex-President Abdoulaye Wade.

But Wade’s release shouldn’t be interpreted as signalling that the dialogue initiative was effective.
A year earlier, Wade had been sentenced to six years in prison for mis-appropriation of funds, by a special anti-corruption court. Established in 1981, and revived by Sall in 2012 after a long period of dormancy, the special court has been heavily criticised.

The UN stated that Wade’s imprisonment was arbitrary and the West African States Community Court of Justice found that constitutionally, as a former minister, he should have been brought before the Senegalese High Court of Justice.

Sall therefore had no choice but to free Wade. But he also clearly took this opportunity to force Wade – a strong contender in the presidential elections – into exile in Qatar.

Khalifa Sall – then mayor of Dakar and another leading opposition contender – was then arrested in 2017 for allegedly embezzling US$3 million in public funds. Critics accused Macky Sall of making up the charges to remove him. Khalifa was released on a presidential pardon last month.
Sall’s government has also continued its authoritarian tactics with systematic bans on opposition protests.

Furthermore, Sall’s promise to institutionalise political dialogue failed to materialise: there was just one round of talks during his first term.

Crisis of confidence

Parliamentary elections, held in July 2017, are seen to have contributed to the crisis facing the country. There were accusations of major irregularities. And after the chaotic elections Sall refused the opposition’s request for a non-partisan Minister of the Interior. The position is meant to be free of party affiliation, as it had been for about 20 years.

Sall then pushed through a reform introducing electoral sponsoring, without consultation. This requires all candidates standing in presidential elections to collect the signatures of at least 1% of the registered voters before being validated. This made it much harder for candidates to run.
Opposition protests were subject to crackdowns and their leaders were arrested.
This new sponsoring law proved to be a boon to the government during the 2019 presidential elections because it limited the number of candidates.

Candidates did not have access to the electoral roll to confirm the validity of their sponsor signatures and thousands of sponsor signatures were invalidated on the false claim that they were not registered to vote. As many as 19 electoral hopefuls had their applications rejected by the Constitutional Council. In the end only five candidates were able to run.

Today national dialogue is at a standstill, and it’s not surprising given the political manoeuvring that undermines it. This presents a worrying future scenario for Senegal.


Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Monday, October 28, 2019

A Nigerian killed, 2 others injured by unknown gunmen in South Africa




By Nsikak Nseyen


The Nigerian community in South Africa has confirmed that one of its member was killed and two others injured by unknown gunmen.

Mr Odefa Ikele, the National Spokesperson of Nigerian Union South Africa, made the disclosure to the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) on Monday in Lagos.

Ikele said the incident that led to the death of Mr Chikamso Ufordi, who hailed from Awgu Local Government Area of Enugu State and injuries sustained by the two others happened at about 7 p.m. on Saturday, Oct. 26, in Nigel.

“One of the witness informed us that the deceased, Mr Chikamso Ufordi, from Awgu LGA Enugu State was trailed by some unknown gun men, and was shot point blank while in his car with two other Nigerian friends.

“His friends also sustained injuries, but the late Chikamso died immediately before help could arrive from the province’s Emergency Medical Services (EMS) team.

“The injured were rushed to the nearest hospital. A case of murder and attempted murder have already been opened at Nigel Police Cluster,’’ Ikele told NAN on telephone.

It is recalled that three Nigerians were among other foreign nationals who on Oct. 22, suffered from fresh xenophobic attacks on foreigners in different locations of Witbank, Mpumanlaga Province, South Africa.

They were reported to have been killed by groups made up of community members and taxi drivers who went to different areas in Witbank attacking foreign-owned businesses and foreigners

Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Sunday, October 27, 2019

R35 billion in South African exports to the USA are at stake in a 'review' just triggered by SA's copyright reform efforts


Phillip de Wet , Business Insider SA


South African exports to the United States worth some R35 billion last year will be at stake when the Office of the United States Trade Representative launches a review of SA's eligibility for duty-free imports under the US system known as the Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP.


The exports threatened include – but go beyond – exports to America under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa).

Agoa exports are predicated on participating African countries being eligible under GSP rules, the US embassy in Pretoria's spokesperson Robert Mearkle told Business Insider South Africa on Sunday.
That implies that should a review end in South Africa being ejected from the GSP, it will automatically be ejected from Agoa too.

"US imports from South Africa under GSP and Agoa equaled a combined total of $2.379 billion in 2018," Mearkle said.
That is the equivalent of R34.8 billion.

All those exports will not necessarily halt if they can no longer be sold in the USA duty-free, but they will become price-uncompetitive if any other countries can sell the same items while still benefiting from Agoa, or the broader GSP.

"During the review, there will no change to GSP participation or to benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa)," said Mearkle.

"The government of South Africa will have the opportunity to participate in the review process," said Mearkle. 

South Africa's department of trade and industry believes that Agoa is so important for the local economy that, in 2016, SA caved in to US demands to allow cheap American chicken to imported into SA – to ongoing controversy and complaints from local chicken producers.

The administration of Donald Trump has used trade tariffs as a blunt weapon for several years, and South Africa has been collateral damage in some of its battles, with the SA automotive, and steel and aluminium, industries affected.

But the GSP review threatens not a subset of South African industries due to relatively small changes to duty-free rules, but South Africa's access to the entirety of American systems set up to encourage growth through trade.

Dates for the review process have not yet been set.

The review was triggered by a complaint from US movie, music, software, and book publishing companies that SA is not doing enough to protect intellectual property.


Amendment legislation on copyright, and the protection of performers, currently awaiting President Cyril Ramaphosa's signature will hamper the creative industry, says American umbrella body the Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) – and provide for insufficient protection for American movies and textbooks.

Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

South Africa's opposition Democratic Alliance chose John Steenhuisen to head the party


Career politician John Steenhuisen was first elected in 1999


John Steenhuisen has been elected parliamentary leader of South Africa's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA).

The DA's former chief whip was chosen after the resignation of Mmusi Maimane as both parliamentary and party leader.

Mr Maimane, who is black, had said the traditionally white party was not the "best vehicle" to create a united South Africa.

In the last seven days, two other senior members resigned from the party.
Herman Mashaba, the black mayor of Johannesburg, resigned on Monday, citing concerns over how the party handled race as one of the reasons for his departure.

On Wednesday, Mr Maimane's resignation was quickly followed by that of party federal chairman Athol Trollip, a white politician who is a Maimane loyalist.
Mr Steenhuisen was the only nominee for the parliamentary leadership, DA official Annelie Lotriet said on Sunday.

The election of the 43-year-old has become a trending topic on Twitter in South Africa with users pointing out that the DA leadership is now all white and questioning the election of a leader who lacks university education.



Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Friday, October 25, 2019

Kenya: Safaricom paves the way for its new CEO


By Morris Kiruga, in Nairobi


Kenya’s leading telco, Safaricom, announced Peter Ndegwa as its new CEO a day after a customer-focused rebrand.

Safaricom announced Ndegwa’s appointment on 24 October. The managing director of Diageo Continental Europe, he will take over in April 2020 as Safaricom’s third chief executive, following the late Bob Collymore, who served from 2010 to July 2019.

The announcement marks the end of a two-year search for a new chief executive. At the heart of the succession debate within the Safaricom board was the issue of nationality, as Safaricom’s two CEOs since inception have been foreigners who eventually took up Kenyan citizenship.

Running Kenya’s most profitable company will be a new challenge for Ndegwa, a Kenyan citizen who has spent the past 15 years in the alcoholic beverages industry.

He joined Diageo group subsidiary East African Breweries in 2004 after an 11-year career in accounting firm PwC and has been managing director of Diageo Continental Europe since July 2018. He previously served as CEO for Guinness Nigeria and Guinness Ghana.

Perhaps to show Ndegwa’s suitability and understanding of the local market, Safaricom chairman Nicholas Nganga pointed out in a profile sent to newsrooms that the Kenyan “is credited with the development of an affordable-beer strategy for EABL resulting in the production of new brands such as Senator beer. Senator beer became one of the most successful innovations by Diageo that has been featured in the Harvard Business Review.”

In February, then Safaricom CEO Bob Collymore told The Africa Report that his successor should be “someone who understands the financial sector a lot more, if we are to occupy the fintech space, and someone who is not going to be scared of going into other markets”.

Birthday rebrand

The announcement came a day after Safaricom celebrated its 19th anniversary on 23 October, and its interim CEO Michael Joseph announced a rebrand and several consumer-facing changes.
Among the biggest changes was switching its brand promise from “Twaweza” (“We can”), which was launched just over a year ago, to “For You”.

Joseph also promised consumers better services and a better overall experience, announcing that the company would start giving new subscribers free SIM-cards from 1 November.

For the company’s 30-million-plus existing customers, the biggest change the telco made was to introduce new voice and data packages without expiry dates. The expiry of such products has been a constant source of consumer complaints in telco markets across Africa.

Safaricom’s announcement comes just weeks after a Nairobi lawyer filed a suit against the expiry of data and voice bundles by the telco and its competitors.

In mid-October, Ghana’s Ministry of Communications directed telcos to rollover unused data and voice bundles.

Late last year, South Africa’s telecoms regulator implemented similar rules, which took effect in March this year, to improve consumer choices and transparency.
The main issue for consumers is that it deprives them of services they have already paid for.

“Is technology stuck somewhere such that it’s impossible to let data last as long as it is not used? Or is this playing well to the vantage of service providers at the expense of the clientele?” a Malawian customer recently asked in a letter to the Lusaka Times.


Data, voice and messaging still account for the largest chunk of Safaricom’s revenue, although payment platform M-Pesa’s revenue share has been growing steadily. In its March 2019 results, for example, the three services accounted for a total of KSh152bn ($1.47bn) of the company’s KSh240bn revenue.

The immediate challenge is that the new bundles without built-in obsolescence will hurt revenue, but the company is banking on increased consumer confidence to bridge the gap. “I expect over time to see a corresponding increase in revenue also as we attract customers from other networks because this is unique to Safaricom,” Joseph said.

Why this matters:

While Ndegwa is still six months away from taking over as Safaricom CEO, his brief will include revitalising the Safaricom brand in its home market as well as leading its potential entry into Ethiopia.

In early October, interim CEO Michael Joseph told the Business Daily that the company was considering buying a stake in Ethio Telecom, the world’s biggest monopoly, or going for a greenfield investment as Ethiopia opens up its telecoms and financial services markets.

Ndegwa will also take over a company facing formidable competition, as Safaricom’s primary competitors, Airtel and Telkom Kenya, are working on a merger/joint venture which could be approved before the end of 2019.


Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Zimbabwe: corruption and patronage do more damage than sanctions




Zimbabwe’s government has declared 25 October a national holiday. The country will come to a standstill. Schools are to be closed and the government has ordered head teachers to bus students to specified venues to attend ceremonies for a day against sanctions.


The origin of this bizarre extravaganza, endorsed by the Southern African Development Community, is to use the day to campaign for the removal of sanctions against Zimbabwe.

It is accompanied by a distasteful splurge of public resources – some say over US$4m – including on a football match and music gala. This is at a time of power blackouts for days, shortages of fuel, banknotes, medicines and other basic needs. Inflation has shot up in the past three months. In June, the government banned the use of foreign currency, deepening the hardship but proclaiming the return of a robust national currency.

That hasn’t happened. Instead, politically connected elites get US dollars from the reserve bank and sell them at a profit on the parallel market, pushing down the value of the revived national currency or “bond dollar”. It currently trades at US$1=Zim$20.

Contested narratives

Zimbabwe’s crisis is decades old and its cause is contested. Ask the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and it all started when Mugabe redistributed land from a handful of white commercial farmers to the majority black population. Upset by the racially corrective nature of land redistribution, ZANU-PF says, European countries  and the United States imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe.

These sanctions, they argue, caused the economic crisis that is reaching breaking point. Mugabe railed against the West’s sanctions and rallied African countries to his anti-imperialist cause.
Sanctions have become a geopolitical football kicked between the Zimbabwean government and its Western foes

Western officials insist there are no sanctions against all Zimbabweans, just targeted restrictions on travel against specific individuals and corporations deemed to be “obstacles to democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe”.

They add that foreign support to Zimbabweans continues via bilateral and multilateral organisations working with local civil society. And that the government cannot be trusted to manage external finance accountably.

Bottom of Form
Starting in 2001, these sanctions were reviewed and renewed every year. In 2013 they were suspended for certain individuals.

The sanctions are based on laws that include the conditions for their removal. In the US, the law is the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (Zidera), enacted in 2001 and renewed annually ever since.

Western governments insist that all the government has to do is undertake democratic reforms and respect human rights for such restrictions to be removed.

Ask ordinary Zimbabweans about sanctions and you get a mixed reaction. Some accept the “sanctions are the cause of all our problems” argument, but many others blame the country’s troubles on local political elites and their excessively corrupt behaviour.

Sanctions have become a geopolitical football kicked between the Zimbabwean government and its Western foes. The truth about sanctions lies between the two.

Chicken and egg

In 2006, I was at a development conference in Helsinki, where the Zimbabwe crisis took centre stage.
The head of the UK’s Department of Foreign Development (DFID) was replaying the argument that there were no sanctions against Zimbabwe, just targeted measures against individuals.

I asked her if she could confirm what proportion of social services (education and health) were financed via direct budget support to the Zimbabwean government. She replied that Zimbabwe had received almost 40% of external financing for basic services, mainly health and education.
This support went directly into the budgets of the ministries. I then asked her whether thus budget support to the government from foreign partners had continued under in the sanctions era.

She was nuanced: “There was no way the UK, Europe and US could maintain direct budget support to a government that could not be trusted with managing money after demonstrations of bad faith and financial impropriety.” This included the raiding of people’s bank accounts and pensions, grand corruption and diversion of resources for public services. That meant no.

Government-to-government aid for vital services had stopped. Then I asked what would happen to health or education services if 40% of their budget was withdrawn. She agreed they would collapse.
The truth is that neither the government nor its former funders in the West were willing to accept responsibility for the terrible conditions. Much easier to blame the other side.

Long overdue but violently and corruptly implemented land reform had triggered a disproportionate reaction from the West. Those same countries said nothing in the mid-1980s when Mugabe massacred thousands of black Zimbabweans.

It was a quick leap to perceptions of prejudiced foreign policy positions, given the racial nature of land ownership that redistribution had sought to correct. Reactions in Western states, and their backing for opposition politicians, played into Mugabe’s hands.
Horse-trading blame about the cause of Zimbabwe’s crisis doesn’t help. Is it sanctions or bad government or both?

Beating Sanctions: Rhodesia vs Zimbabwe

This is not the first time that sanctions have been imposed on our country. When Ian Smith adopted the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Western countries imposed sanctions at the urging of the liberation movements, who argued that until majority rule was introduced Rhodesia should be pressured.

Those sanctions lasted until independence in 1980. Although Rhodesia’s wartime economy struggled under sanctions, it did not collapse. Its currency was trading more strongly than the British Pound. Manufacturing and agricultural exports were robust and social services did not collapse.

Why should Zimbabwe be different? Why have sanctions hit harder on a country at peace than they did on Rhodesia in a civil war?

The answer is clear: bad governance, poor leadership, and the corruption of political elites. Were the country well-governed and led honestly, there is no reason why the suspension of foreign aid should have led to catastrophe.

What caused it was a failure of leadership. Instead of responding to changed circumstances and the demands for pluralism from the opposition, ZANU-PF went into survival mode and resorted to plunder and scapegoating.
After decades of finger pointing about the causes of our economic woes, we need an honest discussion. After the coup that brought Emmerson Mnangagwa to power in November 2017, it emerged that the government had borrowed US$5bn dollars without approval from Parliament and for which it could not account.

It was suspected that the money was parcelled out to senior government and Zanu-PF officials and military officers, some to be used for ZANU-PF’s election campaign last year. Over the past year, the International Monetary Fund reported that the Reserve Bank has allowed the energy company Sakunda to redeem over $300m bonds at highly advantageous rates when almost everyone else was given about a tenth of the face value of their bonds.

Sakunda is owned by Kuda Tagwirei, a fuel baron and close confidante of the president and his deputy, General Constantino Chiwenga. The company was benefiting from these preferential rates at a time when most people were struggling with fuel and forex shortages.

This year, the ministry of finance acknowledged to parliament’s Public Accounts Committee that it could not account for $3bn from the agricultural subsidy scheme called “Command Agriculture”. A key player in this scheme was Tagwirei’s Sakunda Fuels. Last month the government and Reserve Bank suspended Sakunda accounts, but we understand that order has been lifted.

The fundamentals of Zimbabwe’s crisis are not caused by sanctions. Yes, when government-to-government aid was suspended it disrupted clinics and schools, causing suffering to many people. That was a policy choice by Western states in response to land reform and corruption. Those states should accept responsibility for that decision and ask themselves whether cutting off funding to education and health achieves anything more than making social conditions even worse.

This does not exonerate the ZANU-PF government for creating the crises. Since 1982, Zimbabwe has endured one corruption scandal after the other, all benefiting senior ZANU-PF officials. Not a single official has ever been held to account. After the ousting of Mugabe, despite spirited promises by President Mnangagwa, new and bigger scandals have cropped up.

The government hires presidential jets for multiple overseas trips while public hospitals are turning into mass morgues, doctors, nurses, teachers and other government workers get measly wages, and living conditions in the country have deteriorated to levels unseen before.

The country faces its worst drought in years – despite US$3bn having been set aside for agriculture in 2017 – but we learn that the government is importing maize from Tanzania at $600 a tonne when the market price is $240 a tonne. Who organised this contract and who benefits from it? Radio silence from the government.

ZANU-PF doth protest too much: Unpacking Zidera

The US first imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2001 by passing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which included references to the sending of troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the private appropriation of public assets and the fast-track land reform programme.

In 2018, Zidera was amended to remove the DRC deployment and the fast-track land reform issues. The amendment recognised the government’s effort at clearing its IMF arrears, which had blocked credit lines. It included measures the government was required to take to ensure free and fair elections in 2018, such as keeping the military away from the polls and allowing all parties access to the state media.

The amendment introduced some new issues. First, that the government should implement the 2013 constitution, specifically to respect and protect human rights, to account for diamond and mineral revenue, to build peace and unity following the divisive July 2018 elections and to enforce the SADC Tribunal’s decisions on human rights and land compensation.

On close analysis there is nothing in the Zidera amendment that is oppressive, burdensome or impossible for ZANU-PF and the government to deliver. The government fails to account for diamond and other mineral revenues. The looting of public as well as private resources is unabated. Raids on bank accounts continue, with the government and Reserve Bank taking over private citizens’ forex savings.

The government has dragged its feet on implementing human rights provisions in the 2013 constitution. It holds on to draconian and repressive laws and it condones violence by state security, protecting known perpetrators of serious violations.

The killing of  protesters by the army in August 2018, the violent clampdown on protests by the army and police in January 2019, the banning of protests and beating of protesters in August 2019 and the continuing spate of abductions, torture and, at times, killing of government critics, trade union leaders, opposition officials, satirical comedians and civil society activists clearly point to the relevance of the concern at the government’s continued terrible human rights record.

The issues related to the 2018 election have also been raised by electoral observers (including non-Western ones) and commentators, as well as the Motlanthe Commission set up by the government to investigate the August army killings.

Finally, the issue of enforcement of the SADC Tribunal decisions is now moot, laid to rest by President Mnangagwa, ZANU-PF and the government’s commitment to compensate white commercial farmers dispossessed of land in the early 2000s. The government, via the ministry of finance, proceeded to make budget allocation – albeit paltry – for compensating some farmers in 2018. To the extent that it has accepted and attempted to act on this, it doth protest too much about it.

Double standards and sovereign prerogatives

My view is that sanctions by superpowers – whether targeted on individuals or specific entities – are ideologically distasteful, ineffective and inconsistent as an instrument of foreign policy.

They are often selectively applied against countries seen as unfriendly while strategically important countries are spared. They are not applied against Western allies who violate democratic practice and human rights such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Apart from offering a bogeyman to ZANU-PF, sanctions are a blunt instrument

But the foreign policy of a government, including its investment policy, is its own prerogative. Americans and Europeans can decide where to invest their money and to whom to give aid. The sudden withdrawal of government-to-government aid usually hurts ordinary citizens far more than corrupt elites. This is the case in Zimbabwe, where elites loot public assets and the masses suffer. Apart from offering a bogeyman to ZANU-PF, sanctions are a blunt instrument.

Can Zanu-PF have its cake and eat it?

Sanctions are not the point, in the final analysis. There is clear evidence that ZANU-PF has plundered and mismanaged the economy.

One of the responsibilities of a government is to develop policies to manage and steer the politics and economy forward regardless of the prevailing context. In wanting to plunder the economy, abuse citizens’ rights, subvert democracy and violate human rights and then blame it all on the sanctions bogeyman, Zanu-PF has sought to eat its cake and have it. It cannot.



Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Thursday, October 24, 2019

‘Imposter syndrome’ explains why first black leader of South Africa’s main opposition party quit


By Steven Friedman


The politicians who run South Africa’s official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), have probably never heard of “imposter syndrome”. If they had, they might have a better grasp of the problems which confront their party – and its first black leader, Mmusi Maimane, might not have been forced to resign.

“Imposter syndrome” is a state of mind in which a successful and competent person doubts their achievements and harbors a persistent fear that they should not be enjoying success and will soon be exposed as a “fraud”.

It was identified by two American psychologists in a 1978 article, which found that the problem was widespread among high-achieving women, far more so than among men.

Since then, others have connected the dots to explain why people should feel this way. The syndrome, they suggest, is a product of prejudices that insist that some groups should monopolize important tasks and the skills and responsibilities which go with them.

The women with “imposter syndrome” were doing well at jobs that, according to the prejudices among those who controlled their society, only men could do. They were, therefore, sure that men were judging them. And so, in a sense, they began to judge themselves despite the fact that they were clearly good at what they did.

This does not apply only to women who are doing jobs usually monopolized by men. It could equally apply to black people occupying positions that were held only by whites and whose “imposter syndrome” reacts to the prejudice which insists that only whites belong in the role.

This will probably shape how people operate in their “imposter” roles. They could be reluctant to express views or take decisions that might offend others in the organization because they are convinced that the people who used to monopolize the role will dismiss them as a fraud.

It is also possible that, in a way, the people who suffer from the syndrome really are imposters. People who are drawn from a group that did not occupy the post in the past may have ways of doing things that are unlike those of the traditional office holders: women may do some things differently from men, black people may do things differently from whites. They are then likely to be labelled as frauds by others despite the fact that what they are doing may be as effective as – or more effective than – the “traditional” way of doing things.


All of this is directly relevant to this week’s resignation of Mmusi Maimane, who in 2015 became the first black leader of the traditionally white Democratic Alliance (DA).

Depends on who is doing the judging

Maimane was forced out of the party leadership because a DA committee consisting of three white men held him (and some of its white leaders) responsible for the fact that the DA is losing ground in elections. Whether their judgement was fair is hotly debated. But key for “imposter syndrome” is the judgement the panel passed on Maimane. He was, they said, “indecisive” and “conflict averse”.

Given what we know about “imposter syndrome”, it is not hard to see why a committee composed entirely of members of the group that has run the party since it began should judge him this way. If Maimane was indecisive, it may be because he feared deep down that, if he did decide, he would be called out as a fraud by the people who ran the party – this happened anyway, despite his supposed indecision. It is even easier to see why someone conscious of being judged by people constantly testing whether he is “one of us” would want to avoid conflict.

It is also possible that Maimane was an “imposter” in the second sense – that what appeared indecisive and “conflict averse” was actually a different, and perhaps more effective, way of doing things.

The committee’s complaint that he was averse to conflicts may well say more about them than about him. Why is enjoying conflict a virtue? Should we not rather value people who avoid conflict? People with a different value system could see a “conflict averse” person as a “peace lover” or a “conciliator”. And “indecisiveness” could mean a refusal to take decisions the review committee and the rest of the party establishment want him to take, not a failure to decide.

The committee’s verdict on Maimane may be less an indictment of him than a judgement on it and the traditional DA leadership it represents. It suggests not an iota of sensitivity to the possibility that a black person elected to lead a traditionally white organization may find it difficult to be decisive if she or he is subject to constant doubts about whether they really fit the role. Nor is it alive to the possibility that Maimane may have been doing things differently but better and that the organization’s white leadership may have found that difficult.

All this has implications way beyond the DA.

Widespread problem

“Imposter syndrome” is quite likely widespread in South Africa among women and black men who hold senior positions in organizations that were led by men or white people.
The reason would be much the same as it is in the DA – most white-led or male-led organizations tend to think that they can absorb people who were excluded and promote them to leadership positions without changing the organization. The way in which whites or men ran it in the past is assumed to be the only possible way it could run, and changing it would mean “lowering standards”. So, the black men or the women who occupy these posts become “imposters” if they want to do things differently, even if that would strengthen the organization.

At the same time, the prejudices of groups who dominate can be very strong – so strong that the targets of the biases start to wonder deep down whether they are really unfit for the task. In South Africa, white men running large organizations and taking on complicated technical tasks has been the norm for decades and so people come to assume that only they could do these jobs. It is no surprise that black people and women who are perfectly capable of doing them wonder deep down whether they are really up to the task.

So, whether or not Maimane was good at leading the opposition, his resignation is important because it highlights one of the core problems of democratic South Africa – the assumption that the only way to do anything is the way white men did it in the past, and the damaging attitudes that produces on both sides of the divide.



Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.

Côte d’Ivoire: Why the hurry, Guillaume Soro?


By Jeune Afrique


It's not Guillaume Soro's announcement that he will stand for president in Côte d'Ivoire's 2020 election that is surprising so much as the timing.

On 12 October the former rebel leader and prime minister under both Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, who resigned as parliamentary Speaker following a much-publicised falling out with the president in February, was the first to officially throw his hat in the ring.

“Several pro-Soro parties have already chosen me as their candidate, so yes, I will be a candidate.”
In one sentence, pronounced in front of a crowd in Valencia, Spain, Soro put an end to the fake suspense that has surrounded his candidacy for the 2020 presidential election for several months. Welcomed by thunderous applause from his supporters in the Spanish diaspora, the announcement was then widely relayed by Soro’s campaign network.

One question remains: Why was Soro in such a hurry to make his announcement? Especially since, with just over a year to go before the presidential election in October 2020, the country’s main political parties – including the ruling RHDP – have not yet revealed their choices.

Setting his own pace

The announcement comes a month after a meeting in Paris between Soro and Henri Konan Bédié, the leader of the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) who became Alassane Ouattara’s main opponent after being his ally for eight years. At that meeting the two men agreed to each present a ticket in the future presidential election in the hope that they could transfer the votes of the best-placed opposition candidate in the event of a duel with the RHDP.

“In reality, he wants to position himself as a serious challenger – if not the most serious challenger of the upcoming presidential election, the one who will set the pace,” says academic and political journalist François Konan, who notes that up until his declaration “Soro’s been hesitant, walking on eggshells”.

“Guillaume Soro is looking first and foremost for security. He wants a status – that of a candidate – that will attract more external attention in order to ensure his safety,” says political scientist Sylvain N’Guessan. During his speech in Valencia, Soro accused the government in Abidjan of having tried to get him arrested by the Spanish police the previous week.

Formalising the break with the RHDP

“In many cases, countries are battling for the return of their nationals who are in trouble in other countries. In my case, it’s my country that is fighting for all other countries to arrest me,” he said, without pointing the finger specifically. Then he added: “Don’t we have the right as politicians to choose our own party?”

For Sylvain N’Guessan this is a “victimisation strategy” aimed at “drawing attention to himself in order to attract potential voters”.

“It is also about Guillaume Soro reassuring his supporters that the divorce is indeed consummated with the RHDP,” says the analyst, who also points out that the former Speaker wanted to silence the rumours that have been circulating in recent weeks about a supposed truce with the presidential party.

Distinguishing himself within the opposition

The third reason for this “premature” statement, according to N’Guessan: “Soro’s playing his trump card against an opposition that lacks a common strategy, that’s divided by internal crises and personalities. He wants to have an impact in the event that the opposition opts for a single candidate from the first round.

Until now, only Pascal Affi N’Guessan, Laurent Gbagbo’s rival and legal president of the Front Populaire Ivorien, had openly declared his intention to run. The October 2020 election will be the first to be held on the basis of a “ticket” for president and vice-president, a new feature introduced by the 2016 constitutional reform.



Thanks for reading. Follow the page and Share it.