Showing posts with label Corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corruption. Show all posts

Thursday, March 4, 2021

Nigeria gets tough on offshore gambling operators


 Director-general of the Nigerian Lottery Regulatory Commission, Lanre Gbajabiamila

The West African country of Nigeria is the continent’s largest economy, primarily due to its petroleum production and export industries, and is well-known for its long-time love affair with gambling of all kinds. Many in the gambling industry believe that Nigeria has the potential to become the continent’s largest online betting market.

Due to its economic leadership in Africa, what happens in Naija may affect the financial state of the rest of the continent. Yet, despite the apparent success of both online and offline gambling enterprises in Nigeria (with many benefits to the state), government officials are now looking to seriously crack down on offshore and unregulated gambling operators.

Cracking down on unregulated sites
The unprecedented growth of the gambling industry in Nigeria has proved to be the largest obstacle for authorities to properly govern the actions of the operators and players within the country.

When in December of 2019, the state of Lagos began granting licenses for online sports betting, Nigerians were able to start playing at offshore online casinos for decades without fear of prosecution.

Unfortunately, not all government agencies were kept apprised of the swift growth in players playing in offshore establishments, causing a backlash of issues such as capital flight, tax evasion, the non-disclosure of financial transactions and movements of illicit funds.

The collaboration
Recently, the Nigerian Lottery Regulatory Commission (NLRC) sought out the country’s Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) in order to form a cooperative task force to restrict Nigerian gamblers from playing on unregulated sites.

Earlier in 2020, the NLRC had partnered with the country’s Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) to fight “unscrupulous companies” in the country’s gambling industry. Although these organizations have previously worked together to scrutinise operators, they’re now ramping up their efforts.

In a statement, NLRC director-general Lanre Gbajabiamila said, “Our alliance and mutual cooperation are now more imperative, and as responsible agencies, it is our duty to keep pace with the dynamic and growing complexity of the modern lottery industry which features multi-channel availability, the electronic delivery of play, and complex financial transactions.”

It will be interesting to see how this new partnership affects the ongoing reorganization of federal and state cooperation in regulating this ever-growing and ever-changing industry.

Australia as a case study
We expect that Nigeria will continue its aggressive enforcement against offshore operators. Nigerian officials, however, should be wary that many countries have tried this in the past.

Australia is a perfect case-in-point. When the Australian government regulators decided to crack down, they began by implementing site blocking at an ISP (internet service provider) level. This did little to stop the online casinos from simply bypassing the attempted blocks and then it’s back to business as usual for the offshore operators.

For this reason, the two federal departments in cooperation with the state regulators must come up with better ways of combating the unlicensed operators than have been tried in the past.

Gambling in Nigeria
The state of gambling in Nigeria is a complex beast. There’s no doubt that in any nation, the gambling industry does provide significant benefits in the form of jobs, revenue to healthcare and education, and, of course, general entertainment for the population.

For many years, Nigeria’s offline sports betting and gambling industry saw significant year-to-year growth, with its online gambling counterpart gaining strength in the last decade or so with an increase in the country’s population and widespread access to the internet. In 2018, it was reported that Nigeria was the second-largest online betting market in Africa, with gross gaming revenues of $58 million for that year.

The downsides, however, can be just as significant without proper regulation. Federal and state regulatory agencies have never been on the same page about current laws, licensing, or legal procedures for dealing with gambling entities.

Corruption
Public officials in Nigeria do have good reason to fear for the future of unregulated gambling in their country. Concerns have surfaced recently about the uses of illicit money generated by illegal gambling in Nigeria. These include things like money laundering, terrorism financing, “financial leakages” to the unlicensed sector, and other issues that the new regulations are aiming to stamp out.

Recently, the NLRC and the NFIU signed a Memorandum of Understanding that contains their plans to combat these harmful forms of corruption within the nation.

Ambiguous legal status
Confusingly, gambling is currently both legal and illegal in Nigeria, complicating the status of regulated and non-regulated operators. Depending on the type of gambling, the status of the game, operation, or casino could be deemed legal or outside the law.

It’s not surprising then, that many Nigerian government officials have called for new laws to clarify the status of gambling operators in the country. Only time will tell whether the ongoing struggle between federal agencies and state lottery boards issuing licenses and blacklisting operators will solve the country’s current problems or only further muddy the issue going forward.

 


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Friday, January 24, 2020

Nigeria Ex-Justice Minister Charged Over $1.3 Billion Oil Deal



Mohammed Adoke leaves the Federal High Court in Abuja, on Jan. 22. Photographer: Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images

Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission charged Mohammed Adoke, a former justice minister and attorney general, for allegedly taking a bribe to facilitate a $1.3 billion oil deal.

The anti-graft body filed 42 charges against Adoke and accused him of receiving a 300 million naira ($831,000) payment from businessman Aliyu Abubakar in relation to the acquisition of Oil Prospecting License 245 in the Gulf of Guinea, the commission said in an emailed statement.

Adoke pleaded not guilty to all the charges and the case was adjourned to Jan. 27 when bail applications will be heard, the EFCC said.

Abubakar is also being tried alongside other parties, including the local units of Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Eni SpA. The two companies, who deny any wrongdoing, are accused of improperly settling disputes over the oil field.

OPL 245 was created in 1998, when then-petroleum minister Dan Etete carved out the offshore license and awarded it to his own company, Malabu Oil and Gas Ltd. Through successive regimes it was taken from him, awarded to Shell, and then given back, locking the companies and government in legal disputes.

To win control of OPL 245, Shell and partner Eni paid the Nigerian government $1.1 billion. The companies agree the payment was made, but disagree about whether those funds went to bribes.



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Saturday, November 9, 2019

Why Are We Africans Paying More For Internet Than Any Other Part Of The World – Reasons


By Nzekwe Henry


Internet Costs More In Africa Than Anywhere Else In The World
Africans are paying more money than any other part of the world for internet.

A new study has found that consumers in African countries are paying some of the highest rates in the world for internet access, and that’s according to a report released Tuesday, October 22.

For its annual Affordability Report, The Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI) assessed 136 low and middle-income countries and studied internet rates in those countries as a proportion of income.

The A4AI is an initiative of The Web Foundation, founded by the inventor of the Web, Tim Berners-Lee, with partner organizations that include Google and Facebook.
Middle-income examples from the report include Malaysia, Colombia, India, Jamaica, South Africa, and Ghana, while low-income examples were Nepal, Mali, Haiti, Liberia, Yemen, and Mozambique.
As per the findings, the least affordable internet prices in the world are found in Africa.

How The AA4I Arrived At Its Findings

The yardstick used by the AA4I in ascertaining internet affordability in the various countries is the average price of 1GB of mobile broadband data in relation to average monthly income.

By the A4AI’s definition, internet is deemed affordable if the cost of 1GB of broadband data is no more than 2 percent of average monthly income.

Across the African continent, the AA4I found 1GB of data to cost up to 7.12 percent of monthly income, on average. Actually, in some cases, it found that as much as one-fifth of average earnings are consumed by internet costs in parts of the continent.

According to AA4I data, African countries are subject to the least affordable internet prices in the world.

The Countries Where Internet Costs Are Highest

The latest version of the annual report found that citizens of Chad, DR Congo, and the Central African Republic actually pay more than 20 percent of average earnings for 1GB of mobile broadband data, making for the most expensive internet costs.

AA4I’s report branded such prices as “too expensive for all but the wealthiest few,” while implying that cost is the primary challenge keeping an estimated 49 percent of the world’s population offline.

On the other hand, the most affordable rates in the continent are in Egypt at 0.5 percent and Mauritius at 0.59 percent. On a general note, the report found that costs are falling faster in low-income countries than their middle-income counterparts, but in many cases, prices remain the albatross.

What AA4I Identifies As The Cause Of The Problem & Its Solution

In addition, the AA4I blamed the unfavourably high prices on sluggish markets and monopolies, while going ahead to prescribe solutions.

The primary recommendation from the A4AI is for greater liberalization of markets and measures to increase competitiveness. The report highlights competition as essential to successful broadband markets.

The authors also point to the importance of moving from “consolidated markets” — monopolies — to multi-operator markets, stating that it could drastically reduce costs of mobile broadband data.

“Our research estimates that 1GB data in a monopoly mobile market could be as much as USD USD 7.33 more expensive than if it were a two-operator market,” reads the report.

The AA4I places emphasis on “fair rules for market entry and incentives to encourage new competitors” as ideal ways to engender healthy competition.

Earlier this year, a study by UK-based broadband research firm, Cable, came up with pretty much the same finding.

The reports stated that Zimbabwe has the most expensive mobile data in the world, mentioning that 1GB costs USD 75.00 — making it the most pricey in the world.

Interestingly, Indians pay a staggering average of just USD 0.26 for the same quantity of broadband data; a cost that is 289 times cheaper than that of Zimbabwe.
The study also showed that Sub-Saharan Africa is home to four of the six most expensive countries with Zimbabwe on the top of the list joined by Equatorial Guinea (USD 66.00 for 1GB), Saint Helena (USD 55.00 for 1GB), and Djibouti (USD 38.00 for 1GB of data).

However, the African continent also boasts three countries among the top 10 global cheapest in the world. Rwanda tops on the list with 1 GB costing USD 0.56, followed by Sudan USD 0.68, the Democratic Republic of Congo USD 0.88.

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Friday, October 25, 2019

Zimbabwe: corruption and patronage do more damage than sanctions




Zimbabwe’s government has declared 25 October a national holiday. The country will come to a standstill. Schools are to be closed and the government has ordered head teachers to bus students to specified venues to attend ceremonies for a day against sanctions.


The origin of this bizarre extravaganza, endorsed by the Southern African Development Community, is to use the day to campaign for the removal of sanctions against Zimbabwe.

It is accompanied by a distasteful splurge of public resources – some say over US$4m – including on a football match and music gala. This is at a time of power blackouts for days, shortages of fuel, banknotes, medicines and other basic needs. Inflation has shot up in the past three months. In June, the government banned the use of foreign currency, deepening the hardship but proclaiming the return of a robust national currency.

That hasn’t happened. Instead, politically connected elites get US dollars from the reserve bank and sell them at a profit on the parallel market, pushing down the value of the revived national currency or “bond dollar”. It currently trades at US$1=Zim$20.

Contested narratives

Zimbabwe’s crisis is decades old and its cause is contested. Ask the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and it all started when Mugabe redistributed land from a handful of white commercial farmers to the majority black population. Upset by the racially corrective nature of land redistribution, ZANU-PF says, European countries  and the United States imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe.

These sanctions, they argue, caused the economic crisis that is reaching breaking point. Mugabe railed against the West’s sanctions and rallied African countries to his anti-imperialist cause.
Sanctions have become a geopolitical football kicked between the Zimbabwean government and its Western foes

Western officials insist there are no sanctions against all Zimbabweans, just targeted restrictions on travel against specific individuals and corporations deemed to be “obstacles to democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe”.

They add that foreign support to Zimbabweans continues via bilateral and multilateral organisations working with local civil society. And that the government cannot be trusted to manage external finance accountably.

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Starting in 2001, these sanctions were reviewed and renewed every year. In 2013 they were suspended for certain individuals.

The sanctions are based on laws that include the conditions for their removal. In the US, the law is the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (Zidera), enacted in 2001 and renewed annually ever since.

Western governments insist that all the government has to do is undertake democratic reforms and respect human rights for such restrictions to be removed.

Ask ordinary Zimbabweans about sanctions and you get a mixed reaction. Some accept the “sanctions are the cause of all our problems” argument, but many others blame the country’s troubles on local political elites and their excessively corrupt behaviour.

Sanctions have become a geopolitical football kicked between the Zimbabwean government and its Western foes. The truth about sanctions lies between the two.

Chicken and egg

In 2006, I was at a development conference in Helsinki, where the Zimbabwe crisis took centre stage.
The head of the UK’s Department of Foreign Development (DFID) was replaying the argument that there were no sanctions against Zimbabwe, just targeted measures against individuals.

I asked her if she could confirm what proportion of social services (education and health) were financed via direct budget support to the Zimbabwean government. She replied that Zimbabwe had received almost 40% of external financing for basic services, mainly health and education.
This support went directly into the budgets of the ministries. I then asked her whether thus budget support to the government from foreign partners had continued under in the sanctions era.

She was nuanced: “There was no way the UK, Europe and US could maintain direct budget support to a government that could not be trusted with managing money after demonstrations of bad faith and financial impropriety.” This included the raiding of people’s bank accounts and pensions, grand corruption and diversion of resources for public services. That meant no.

Government-to-government aid for vital services had stopped. Then I asked what would happen to health or education services if 40% of their budget was withdrawn. She agreed they would collapse.
The truth is that neither the government nor its former funders in the West were willing to accept responsibility for the terrible conditions. Much easier to blame the other side.

Long overdue but violently and corruptly implemented land reform had triggered a disproportionate reaction from the West. Those same countries said nothing in the mid-1980s when Mugabe massacred thousands of black Zimbabweans.

It was a quick leap to perceptions of prejudiced foreign policy positions, given the racial nature of land ownership that redistribution had sought to correct. Reactions in Western states, and their backing for opposition politicians, played into Mugabe’s hands.
Horse-trading blame about the cause of Zimbabwe’s crisis doesn’t help. Is it sanctions or bad government or both?

Beating Sanctions: Rhodesia vs Zimbabwe

This is not the first time that sanctions have been imposed on our country. When Ian Smith adopted the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Western countries imposed sanctions at the urging of the liberation movements, who argued that until majority rule was introduced Rhodesia should be pressured.

Those sanctions lasted until independence in 1980. Although Rhodesia’s wartime economy struggled under sanctions, it did not collapse. Its currency was trading more strongly than the British Pound. Manufacturing and agricultural exports were robust and social services did not collapse.

Why should Zimbabwe be different? Why have sanctions hit harder on a country at peace than they did on Rhodesia in a civil war?

The answer is clear: bad governance, poor leadership, and the corruption of political elites. Were the country well-governed and led honestly, there is no reason why the suspension of foreign aid should have led to catastrophe.

What caused it was a failure of leadership. Instead of responding to changed circumstances and the demands for pluralism from the opposition, ZANU-PF went into survival mode and resorted to plunder and scapegoating.
After decades of finger pointing about the causes of our economic woes, we need an honest discussion. After the coup that brought Emmerson Mnangagwa to power in November 2017, it emerged that the government had borrowed US$5bn dollars without approval from Parliament and for which it could not account.

It was suspected that the money was parcelled out to senior government and Zanu-PF officials and military officers, some to be used for ZANU-PF’s election campaign last year. Over the past year, the International Monetary Fund reported that the Reserve Bank has allowed the energy company Sakunda to redeem over $300m bonds at highly advantageous rates when almost everyone else was given about a tenth of the face value of their bonds.

Sakunda is owned by Kuda Tagwirei, a fuel baron and close confidante of the president and his deputy, General Constantino Chiwenga. The company was benefiting from these preferential rates at a time when most people were struggling with fuel and forex shortages.

This year, the ministry of finance acknowledged to parliament’s Public Accounts Committee that it could not account for $3bn from the agricultural subsidy scheme called “Command Agriculture”. A key player in this scheme was Tagwirei’s Sakunda Fuels. Last month the government and Reserve Bank suspended Sakunda accounts, but we understand that order has been lifted.

The fundamentals of Zimbabwe’s crisis are not caused by sanctions. Yes, when government-to-government aid was suspended it disrupted clinics and schools, causing suffering to many people. That was a policy choice by Western states in response to land reform and corruption. Those states should accept responsibility for that decision and ask themselves whether cutting off funding to education and health achieves anything more than making social conditions even worse.

This does not exonerate the ZANU-PF government for creating the crises. Since 1982, Zimbabwe has endured one corruption scandal after the other, all benefiting senior ZANU-PF officials. Not a single official has ever been held to account. After the ousting of Mugabe, despite spirited promises by President Mnangagwa, new and bigger scandals have cropped up.

The government hires presidential jets for multiple overseas trips while public hospitals are turning into mass morgues, doctors, nurses, teachers and other government workers get measly wages, and living conditions in the country have deteriorated to levels unseen before.

The country faces its worst drought in years – despite US$3bn having been set aside for agriculture in 2017 – but we learn that the government is importing maize from Tanzania at $600 a tonne when the market price is $240 a tonne. Who organised this contract and who benefits from it? Radio silence from the government.

ZANU-PF doth protest too much: Unpacking Zidera

The US first imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2001 by passing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which included references to the sending of troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the private appropriation of public assets and the fast-track land reform programme.

In 2018, Zidera was amended to remove the DRC deployment and the fast-track land reform issues. The amendment recognised the government’s effort at clearing its IMF arrears, which had blocked credit lines. It included measures the government was required to take to ensure free and fair elections in 2018, such as keeping the military away from the polls and allowing all parties access to the state media.

The amendment introduced some new issues. First, that the government should implement the 2013 constitution, specifically to respect and protect human rights, to account for diamond and mineral revenue, to build peace and unity following the divisive July 2018 elections and to enforce the SADC Tribunal’s decisions on human rights and land compensation.

On close analysis there is nothing in the Zidera amendment that is oppressive, burdensome or impossible for ZANU-PF and the government to deliver. The government fails to account for diamond and other mineral revenues. The looting of public as well as private resources is unabated. Raids on bank accounts continue, with the government and Reserve Bank taking over private citizens’ forex savings.

The government has dragged its feet on implementing human rights provisions in the 2013 constitution. It holds on to draconian and repressive laws and it condones violence by state security, protecting known perpetrators of serious violations.

The killing of  protesters by the army in August 2018, the violent clampdown on protests by the army and police in January 2019, the banning of protests and beating of protesters in August 2019 and the continuing spate of abductions, torture and, at times, killing of government critics, trade union leaders, opposition officials, satirical comedians and civil society activists clearly point to the relevance of the concern at the government’s continued terrible human rights record.

The issues related to the 2018 election have also been raised by electoral observers (including non-Western ones) and commentators, as well as the Motlanthe Commission set up by the government to investigate the August army killings.

Finally, the issue of enforcement of the SADC Tribunal decisions is now moot, laid to rest by President Mnangagwa, ZANU-PF and the government’s commitment to compensate white commercial farmers dispossessed of land in the early 2000s. The government, via the ministry of finance, proceeded to make budget allocation – albeit paltry – for compensating some farmers in 2018. To the extent that it has accepted and attempted to act on this, it doth protest too much about it.

Double standards and sovereign prerogatives

My view is that sanctions by superpowers – whether targeted on individuals or specific entities – are ideologically distasteful, ineffective and inconsistent as an instrument of foreign policy.

They are often selectively applied against countries seen as unfriendly while strategically important countries are spared. They are not applied against Western allies who violate democratic practice and human rights such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Apart from offering a bogeyman to ZANU-PF, sanctions are a blunt instrument

But the foreign policy of a government, including its investment policy, is its own prerogative. Americans and Europeans can decide where to invest their money and to whom to give aid. The sudden withdrawal of government-to-government aid usually hurts ordinary citizens far more than corrupt elites. This is the case in Zimbabwe, where elites loot public assets and the masses suffer. Apart from offering a bogeyman to ZANU-PF, sanctions are a blunt instrument.

Can Zanu-PF have its cake and eat it?

Sanctions are not the point, in the final analysis. There is clear evidence that ZANU-PF has plundered and mismanaged the economy.

One of the responsibilities of a government is to develop policies to manage and steer the politics and economy forward regardless of the prevailing context. In wanting to plunder the economy, abuse citizens’ rights, subvert democracy and violate human rights and then blame it all on the sanctions bogeyman, Zanu-PF has sought to eat its cake and have it. It cannot.



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Tuesday, October 22, 2019

Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 1, a family feast.


By Zoé Eisenstein and Patrick Smith

 
After the civil war Angola's capital Luanda became a boomtown of flash cars and fast cash / SILVAP/stock.adobe.com

At the end of the devastating civil war, in 2002, Angolans had the chance to rebuild their broken country using its bountiful resources of oil, gas and diamonds.

It was the start of a commodity super-cycle and in the next decade and a half the country earned more than $600bn in export revenue. But economists tell us that at least 15% of the country’s earnings were diverted into private accounts.

Many reconstruction projects were badly run and hugely overpriced, thwarting the majority’s hopes for better clinics and schools. They cheered when new President João Lourenço promised a crackdown on corruption.

In this 5-part investigation, The Africa Report examines what happened in Angola; getting inside the system and the people who ran it, and asks whether Lourenço can get the money back.
We begin with a look at the man who created Angola’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais.

A FAMILY FEAST

Hours after his release from Viana maximum security prison, clutching an Angolan passport in one hand and a Swiss passport in the other, multimillionaire Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais stood in front of a portrait of President João Lourenço and grinned for the camera.

The head of Quantum Global, the company that managed $5bn in assets for Angola’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), Bastos had spent six months in one of the country’s toughest goals.
Bastos was free in March 2019 thanks to an undisclosed settlement with the SWF so that he would not face charges.

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The Swiss-Angolan entrepreneur Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais quickly adapted to life at the top /Wikicommons


Soon after the photo was taken, Bastos flew to Dubai. Close friends say they have not heard from him since. “They’ve [the Angolan authorities] taken everything, but he’ll start all over again,” a loyal friend told The Africa Report in a Zurich beer hall. “He’s done a lot for African culture.”

Few doubt that the quirky, charismatic Bastos will bounce back. There was “something manic, almost messianic about his business plans for Africa,” one of his acquaintances told us.
In September 2018, Bastos was arrested, taken to Viana and held without charges. On the same day, José Filomeno dos Santos (‘Zenú’), a close friend of Bastos and the son of former president José Eduardo dos Santos, was sent to São Paulo prison hospital.

Both men insist on their innocence.

For many Angolans, their detention was a symbolic break with ex-president Dos Santos, who had been in power for 38 years.

A freelancer for professional services firm Deloitte, Bastos landed with big dreams in Luanda in 2004, just as the oil-fired economy was revving up. He called Marcel Kruse, a colleague on a couple of ill-starred ventures in Switzerland. “Marcel, we’re going to do investment banking,” Bastos told him in September 2004.

A few weeks later, Kruse was with Bastos in Luanda looking at a number of projects. Two years later, they were sitting around a boardroom table with people like the stepson of the head of the state oil company, Sonangol, and the son of President Dos Santos.

When Zenú joined the project, Banco Kwanza Invest – as it is now called – took off. Bastos, working solo, clinched a contract to manage some of the central bank’s gold reserves. One day, Bastos breezed into Kruse’s office: “Give me your car. Now this Range Rover is yours.”

The accountant recoiled at the prospect of giving up his trusty Toyota. Bastos said that their Angolan counterparts would not take them seriously if they did not look the part.

This was the Luanda zeitgeist.

A hundred metres from the office, a fortunate few sat at cafés overlooking the bay, sipping cocktails at $30 a throw. Along the street, a line of Hummers and luxury 4x4s cruised past. An expatriate army of petroleum engineers, trade-finance specialists and diamond dealers had joined the oil bonanza. By 2010, Luanda was the world’s most expensive city for expats.

It went from war zone to boom town.

Many Angolans watched, puzzling how their country could produce so much wealth while so little filtered into their daily lives – into schools, clinics, state companies managing the electricity and water supplies.

Bastos’ ascent in Luanda was easy to understand, according to an associate. “When I met him first he had Rasta hair, he was a bass player […] he was this multilingual, charismatic person, a young guy full of ideas.”

As the economy took off towards a world-beating 23% growth in a year, Luanda’s nightlife exploded. Once a sandy landing ground for small fishing boats, the Ilha do Cabo hosted a strip of nightclubs that would fit in Rio de Janiero’s upscale Gávea neighbourhood.

An inveterate socialiser, Bastos fitted right in. “Jean-Claude would always have his crowd around him,” said his associate. “[It was] kind of fun because you always met new people […], a bit more interesting than going out for pizza.”

As Quantum’s business boomed, so did Bastos’s profile. He became an investment guru on the Africa conference circuit, threw parties for A-list celebrities and, like many in Luanda’s nomenklatura, took to using private jets. He made much of his plans to “reward innovation” through an annual Africa innovation prize.

Bastos and presidential scion Zenú became inseparable friends, holed up for hours in business discussions at the Banco Kwanza offices.

It was leading to yet another coup de théâtre – the launching of the Fundo Soberano de Angola, the country’s $5bn SWF in 2012. Zenú ended up as chairman. Then Bastos’s Swiss-based company Quantum Global was appointed to manage the SWF’s assets.

Questions quickly arose about the lack of a competitive tender for the asset-management contract, conflicts of interest and high fees. The mammoth Port of Caio was launched by Bastos’s company, which “invited” the SWF to invest.

This was not a conflict of interest, Bastos told Britain’s The Guardian newspaper: “We view these investments as having aligned interest.” Equally, Bastos told the Swiss weekly Die Weltwoche that criticism of the fees earned by his company from the SWF – more than $90m between May 2014 and December 2015 – was misplaced. “We have standards which correspond to international norms. We receive 2% of the fund’s volume plus 20% of the generated capital gain,” explained Bastos.

Many businesspeople we spoke to saw the SWF as part of the patronage system. One explained: “The SWF was created in a moment of hubris. There had been a slow build-up. Every bank had to have a Dos Santos in the structure. The next step was to give Zenú the fund. That was a step too far. Then everyone’s ears pricked up.”

In January 2018, Lourenço – who became president in September 2017 – sacked the board of the SWF, appointing a new chairman to guarantee “a more efficient and transparent use of the state’s strategic resources”.


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